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I. Introduction 
Welcome to the new millennium, where you ask a stranger to drive 
you around in his car, stay in a stranger’s spare bedroom while on vacation, 
buy a stranger’s used shoes having never seen them, and have a stranger 
over to your home to build some furniture for you, and you do it all in 
minutes, over the Internet, with a couple of clicks – having technically 
executed a contract that agrees you’re completely responsible if anything 
goes awry.  This is the “on-demand economy.” 
A panoply of early-stage companies has emerged to find new ways to 
use the Internet to profit from connecting consumers with goods and 
services they desire through this “on-demand economy.”  These multitudes 
of snappily-named enterprises, large and small, can be grouped into four 
relatively simple categories: (1) marketplaces, where goods or property 
owned by a third party can be bought and sold through a web-based 
platform where end-users choose to buy and sell, (2) contractor 
marketplaces, where a skilled service provider can be hired on a temporary, 
task-basis to apply his or her skilled labor to a task proposed by the user, 
(3) gig platforms, where a consumer can ask for a particular gig or task to 
be performed that is designed by the platform, but no individual provider is 
under an obligation to appear to provide the service, and (4) service 
platforms, where a consumer requests a particular service designed by the 
platform and the platform can guarantee an individual service provider will 
be able to deliver.  Albeit in different ways, the economic reality of the 
workers in each of these four circumstances is comparably both traditional 
employees and traditional independent contractors.  Below I assess how 
these similarities and differences justify a unique classification – or at least 
a novel legal treatment – for workers on a gig platform. 
Most entities with enough money to consult a lawyer will impose 
“clickwrap”1 terms and conditions to manage relationships between the 
consumer, the provider, and the platform.  These terms and conditions 
grant these entities great flexibility to disclaim liability and warranties.  
These entities may use these same clickwrap forms to define workers’ 
roles, responsibilities, and classification, for example, as independent 
contractors or employees.  Clickwrap agreements were reliably enforceable 
until recently.  Of late, adjudicative bodies including at least one state labor 
commissioner began to ignore them in deciding disputes regarding worker 
classification involving individuals who “signed” clickwrap terms.2  Claims 
 
 1.  A term of judicial origin, which is defined in detail infra. 
 2.  See Berwick v. Uber Techs., Inc., Labor Comm’n No. 11-46739 EK (June 3, 2015), 
Supre. Ct. No. CGC-15-546378. 
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regarding worker reclassification have been allowed to proceed despite 
being arguably barred by the plain language of the clickwrap contract.3 
This article discusses how traditional rules surrounding worker 
classification provide, or fail to provide, clear guidance on how to classify 
workers in the four categories mentioned above.  While Marketplaces, 
Contractor Marketplaces, and service platforms benefit from this guidance,4 
Gig Platforms’ workers are not entirely well suited to classification as 
either independent contractors or employees.  This lack of guidance from 
traditional rules for emerging ways of doing business creates confusion that 
acts to prevent on-demand economy companies from providing benefits 
they often want to provide for workers and creates apprehension around 
how to structure their relationships with workers. 
Given that classification assertions are required by the IRS in an 
entity’s annual tax filings,5 I propose below a means to use updated 
versions of those tax filings to drive intelligent, custom-built legislation to 
govern worker classification in Gig Platforms.  Such federal legislation 
could selectively negate clickwrap terms where justified by long-
recognized public policy goals, and serve those public policy goals in the 
modern workforce by applying either existing employee or independent 
contractor rules to the freelancers who take work from Gig Platforms under 
certain pre-identified circumstances. 
II. The On-Demand Economy and the Niche of the Gig Platform 
The on-demand economy emerged over the last decade as a new 
commercial model facilitated by the laws of online contracts.6  While the 
media commonly uses the term “on-demand” economy to refer to a 
multitude of online platforms, companies, and web-based software-as-a-
service providers, this article focuses on four specific categories of web-
based services with common characteristics.  Categorizing on-demand 
companies in this way highlights how the law is lagging behind technology 
in a near-calamitous fashion; existing classification rules address a black 
 
 3.  See id. 
 4.  Workers are classified as independent contractors in the former two and as employees 
in latter. 
 5.  Corporations must file (1) a Form 1099-MISC (also sent to the contractor) for all 
contractors who made $600+, (2) a Form W-2 (also sent to the employee) for all employee wages, 
(3) a Form 1120 (general tax return) that has line items for compensation of employees and 
contractor expense (which is “other expense” in section 2). 
 6.  For one of many, many examples of the use of this term in the press, see Lauren Weber, 
What if There Were a New Type of Worker? Dependent Contractor, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 28, 2015, 
10:28 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/what-if-there-were-a-new-type-of-worker-dependent-
contractor-1422405831. 
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and white dichotomy (employee vs. contractor) where these marketplace 
realities warrant a more nuanced approach. 
A. Distinguishing On-Demand Services 
Here are the different kinds of companies constituting the “On-
Demand Economy” considered in this article: 
 
1) Marketplace 
Description:  Web-based forum, which facilitates transaction 
in goods or property between third party consumers and the 
owner/producer of the goods.  
 
1) Examples: 
x Pure Marketplaces – eBay and Etsy; 
x “Part of the Business” Marketplace – Amazon (where it’s own 
brand of goods are sold such as Kindle Fire and goods of third party 
companies); 
x “Forum” Marketplace – Craigslist (a forum to buy and sell goods); and 
x Marketplace dedicated for renting and sharing of goods – Airbnb,7 
Getaround8 or NeighborGoods.9 
 
2) Contractor Marketplace 
Description:  A platform where end-users can locate and/or 
engage independent contractors with specialized skills but 
neither the task nor the performance is specified by the web-
based platform; at most, the platform provides for reviews of 
service providers’ performance or some practice tools.   
 
2) Examples: 
x Telemedicine platforms10 or companies like InCloudCounsel,11 





 7.  See, e.g., AIRBNB, www.airbnb.com. 
 8.  See, e.g., GETAROUND, www.getaround.com. 
 9.  See, e.g., NEIGHBORGOODS, http://neighborgoods.net. 
 10.  See, e.g., TELEMEDICINE, www.telemedicine.com. 
 11.  See, e.g., INCLOUDCOUNSEL, www.incloudcounsel.com. 
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3) Gig Platform 
Description:  A web-based tool that connects service 
providers with consumers in search of a particularized 
service, where the platform defines the service but does not 
promise there will be a worker to provide it.   
 
3) Examples: 
x Uber, Lyft, and Sidecar (connecting passengers with individual or 
entity “transportation providers”); 
x Handy (connecting handymen or maids to those who are in need of 
home-related services; or 
x Taskrabbit (connecting consumers seeking a individual who can 
perform a particular task). 
 
4) Service Platform 
Description:  A website or application where end-users visit 
to receive a very specific service defined by the platform at a 
specific time and place.  
 
4) Examples: 
x Instacart (which allows users to order groceries and similar items 
and engages a shopper to purchase and deliver the groceries in a 
specified timeframe) and Shyp or Postmates (which allow users to 
arrange to have a package picked up from one place and delivered to 
another at a specified time). 
 
This article does not discuss Service Platforms in depth because, for 
the purposes of this argument, there is little difference between Service 
Platforms’ relationships with their workers and traditional employer-
employee relationships.  They do use clickwrap terms, as most internet-
based companies do.  And some do use independent contractors, or at least 
begin by designating a portion of their service providers as independent 
contractors.  But several Service Platforms have recently announced that 
they will shift worker classification for those that perform services through 
the platform to “employee” from “independent contractor.”12  This seems 
 
 12.  Connie Loizos, CEO Kevin Gibbon On Why Shyp Is Converting Its 1099 Workers Into 
W2 Employees, TechCrunch (July 1, 2015), http://techcrunch.com/2015/07/01/ceo-kevin-gibbon-
on-why-shyp-is-converting-its-1099-workers-into-w2-employees; see also Greg Bensinger, 
Wading Into Silicon Valley Debate, Shyp Will Make Employees of Its Contractors, WALL ST. J. 
(July 1, 2015, 1:38 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2015/07/01/wading-into-silicon-valley-
6 - HUBLEY_ONLINECONSENT-EDITED-PROD-FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/13/2015  3:35 PM 
WINTER 2016]        ONLINE CONSENT AND THE ON-DEMAND COMMUNITY 7 
consistent with the day-to-day tasks and management of Service Platform 
workers, given that the market appears to be addressing this type of 
classification disconnect; consequently, this argument does not focus on 
Service Platforms other than as a point of comparison. 
Marketplaces, Gig Platforms, and other sites designed to help 
consumers find skilled service providers are commonly conflated by their 
own press commentary, venture capitalists, and media outlets.  They are all 
lumped into the “on-demand” economy” or the “sharing economy” 
categories used by the press, by venture capitalists, and other 
commentators.  However, enterprises in the Gig Platform category have 
important common characteristics that Marketplaces or Contractor 
Marketplaces lack and that I argue warrant distinct treatment.  While 
existing legal structures still work well for worker classification and 
taxation surrounding Marketplaces and Contractor Marketplaces, they are 
outdated and inapplicable in light of the Gig Platforms’ novel structures 
and characteristics. 
B. How Gig Platforms Relate to Traditional Employment Categories 
Why distinguish Gig Platforms from Marketplaces or Contractor 
Marketplaces?  Because extant tax and employment law structures have a 
unique disconnect with Gig Platforms.  The practical consequence of the 
melee of decades-old, complex state and federal laws governing worker 
classification is that most startups that transact over the Internet by 
connecting end-users with third party functions — Marketplace, Gig 
Platform, or otherwise — will not be able to easily determine how to 
classify those third parties. 
Background on the genesis of the “1099 Contractor” is helpful to 
explain this disconnect.  Individuals who perform work for an entity can 
currently do so under one of only two key tax distinctions: either as an 
“employee” or as an “independent contractor.”  These traditional categories 
are summarized briefly below and are determined subject to a multi-factor, 
case-by-case analysis governed by a plethora of federal and state level 
courts and administrative bodies. 
It is difficult, though not impossible, to surmise whether any on-
demand economy worker is an employee or independent contractor within 
 
debate-shyp-will-make-employees-of-its-contractors/?mod=ST1.  It is not surprising that such 
companies begin life using contractors to cut down on costs, but it is relevant that, once they 
reach a level where public scrutiny may apply, they are opting to reclassify workers rather than 
fight in court to preserve contractor classifications. 
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the existing framework.  The IRS does provide a form, the SS-8,13 that 
either the entity or the worker can file to ask the IRS to determine which 
classification is appropriate for federal income tax purposes.  In light of the 
additional tax and employment law obligations an entity has for its 
employees that do not apply to its contractors (discussed infra), startup 
companies appear inclined to treat workers as independent contractors as 
often as and for as long as possible.14 
Even among the melee of existing classification laws, one thing is 
clear: for purposes of its federal taxes, an entity files a “W-2” form to 
report wages paid to employees and a “1099-MISC” form to report 
payments to its individual contractors.  The IRS’ 1099 category includes a 
number of forms15 that an entity can use to report business expense to the 
IRS.  For example, Form 1099-K16 is available to entities for reporting 
processing of third party payments to a large number of unrelated recipients 
through “accounts with a central organization by a substantial number of 
providers of goods or services who are unrelated to the organization.”17 
In the 1980s, when the IRS rules of worker classification were first 
crafted, the W-2 versus 1099-MISC distinctions made great sense.  The 
categories reflected the reality of the 1980s workplace for an employee 
versus an independent contractor, and the control-based manner of 
distinguishing these lined up well with public policy and the workers’ 
reality.  But this is no longer the case.  The Internet has inexorably blurred 
these lines. 
1. Traditional Employees 
Employees rely upon — and work as a carefully controlled element of 
— employers’ reputations’ to earn income.  As employees, workers are 
generally subject to employers’ instructions regarding how, when, and by 
 
 13.  Form SS-8: Determination of Worker Status for Purposes of Federal Employment Taxes 
and Income Tax Withholding, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREAS., I.R.S. (May 2014), http://www.irs.gov/ 
pub/irs-pdf/fss8.pdf. 
 14.  This observation is based generally on marketplace behavior of pre-IPO startup 
companies in the 2010-2015 timeframe. 
 15.  Forms Related To General Instructions for Certain Information Returns, U.S. DEP’T OF 
THE TREAS., I.R.S., http://www.irs.gov/uac/About-Form-1099-Related-Forms. 
 16.  Form 1099-K Payment Card and Third Party Network Transactions, U.S. DEP’T OF 
THE TREAS., I.R.S., http://www.irs.gov/uac/Form-1099-K,-Merchant-Card-and-Third-Party-
Network-Payments. 
 17.  2015 Instructions for Form 1099-K, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREAS., I.R.S., http://www.irs. 
gov/pub/irs-pdf/i1099k.pdf. 
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what means tasks are performed.18  If, in the course and scope of 
performing employment duties, an employee negligently or criminally 
causes harm to another individual or entity, the employer can be subject to 
“vicarious liability” (aka respondeat surperior) for the harm caused by the 
employee.19  The employer will also be subject to a number of state and 
federal tax obligations for its employees that will be discussed in detail 
infra, and include social security and Medicare taxes.  If the employee falls 
below either a state or federal salary threshold or works by the hour, certain 
wage and hour restrictions apply to employees.20  The employer may 
additionally incentivize individuals to become employees by offering 
benefits like health insurance, disability insurance, life insurance, paid 
leave, and pre-tax accounts to set aside funds for expenses like commuting 
or retirement savings.21  Since the passage of the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act (“ACA”),22 employers with more than 100 employees 
are also required to provide some “Minimum Essential Coverage” (i.e., 
compliant health insurance) to employees.23  
 
 18.  In addition, employees generally have specified times they must appear for work, and 
they are paid a salary or hourly wage regardless of which tasks or projects they work on.  Should 
employees invent something in the course of employment, they are obligated to assign ownership 
of that invention to their employer under the “work for hire” doctrine and myriad state and federal 
statues, as well as more specific employment agreement contractual provisions. 
 19.  The precise outlines of when such liability attaches depend upon the applicable state 
law. For examples of how one state, Pennsylvania, considers when vicarious liability is not 
appropriate, see Valles v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., 758 A.2d 1238 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000) 
(assessing whether an allegedly negligent doctor was an employee of a hospital or an independent 
contractor of that hospital in determining whether liability would attach); Dee v. Marriott Int’l, 
Inc., 1999 WL 975125 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 6, 1999) (analyzing whether one employee’s sexual assault 
against another was subject to vicarious liability or was instead “excessive and so dangerous as to 
be totally without responsibility or reason” such that it should be treated as being outside the 
scope of employment). 
 20.  As an example, California surveys the various thresholds that apply to myriad 
professions on the Division of Labor Standards Enforcement website, available at http://www.dir. 
ca.gov/dlse/faq_overtimeexemptions.htm. 
 21.  The IRS 20 factor test and state-level analyses do consider whether the entity provides 
“employee-like benefits” to the worker — however, not providing these does not clearly read in 
favor of a contractor classification.  By contrast, there is a potential reclassification danger to an 
entity that helps contractors buy health or disability insurance — so they are not incentivized by 
current laws from providing such benefits to Giglancers. 
 22.  See 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A (2010) et seq. 
 23.  For a summary of coverage that constitutes “Minimum Essential Coverage” under the 
ACA, see http://www.irs.gov/Affordable-Care-Act/Individuals-and-Families/ACA-Individual-
Shared-Responsibility-Provision-Minimum-Essential-Coverage.  See also IRS Notice 2013-54, 
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/n-13-54.pdf.  The employer also pays the expenses 
for tools and materials necessary to perform work tasks, which are in service of the employer’s 
bottom-line profits. 
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In general, employees accept a fixed salary or hourly wage in 
exchange for appearing at a specified time and place to work in a role 
defined (and free to be redefined) at the will of the employer.  The work 
performed is generated through the employers’ business, whose revenue 
paid the salary.  The employers’ payroll taxes go toward things like 
covering the government’s cost of unemployment benefits and social 
security once the employee is no longer employed, and the employer is 
required by state law to carry Workers Compensation insurance that pays 
for injuries sustained by the worker on the job.  The employer’s respondeat 
superior liability in turn makes that employer responsible for the 
employee’s on-the-job negligence and/or other harm to third parties.24  
Usually an employer “withholds” projected individual income taxes on 
behalf of employees and automatically transmits it to the Treasury 
Department, to which the employer reports the employee’s wages on IRS 
Form W-2. 
2. Traditional Independent Contractors 
An independent contractor, by contrast, is hired to perform a specific 
task or drive a specific outcome,25 and relies upon his or her own reputation 
to earn income.  The time in which work is completed and the means by 
which it may be completed is in the contractor’s discretion, though of 
course the hiring entity could specify a high-level timeline or certain 
features for deliverables.26  The entity that hires a contractor does not pay 
employment taxes, such a Medicare and other Payroll taxes; instead the 
contractor must pay such taxes in the form of “self-employment” taxes to 
the IRS.27  They must shop for and purchase their own health insurance, 
disability insurance, life insurance, and other similar “benefits” some 
employers provide. 
 
 24.  Christensen v. Swenson, 874 P.2d 125 (Utah 1994). 
 25.  Though definitions differ by jurisdiction, see, e.g., Antelope Valley Press v. Poizner, 75 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 887, 900 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (describing the traditional “notion [of] an 
independent contractor [as] someone hired to achieve a specific result that is attainable within a 
finite period of time, such as plumbing work, tax service, or the creation of a work of art for a 
building’s lobby.”). 
 26.  The traditional test for whether a worker is an independent contractor presumes that a 
contractor will provide and pay for the means to complete the task (i.e., the tools and equipment) 
unless her agreement with the entity provides otherwise, and that the contractor has discretion to 
choose work hours and accept whether or not to perform any given task. 
 27.  Independent contractors personally pay a “self-employment tax” along with their 
income taxes for amounts received from a contracting entity, and those amounts are reported on 
an IRS Form 1099-MISC. 
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For individual independent contractors (“freelancers”) thirty years 
ago, however, the circumstances were notably different than they are today.  
There was no ready method of acquiring 1099 work except through the 
reputation, professional license, and/or specialized skills.  These publicly 
recognized credentials were not usually cheap or easy to acquire. 
For example, a lawyer’s credibility would be established by 
membership in a state bar association and passing of the bar, through client 
referrals, and by publicity of the lawyer’s success in court or a huge merger 
they had helped orchestrate.  Sometimes lawyers partner to amalgamate 
reputations (among other things) and develop business together — but their 
individual ability or reputation help them create those partnerships.  An 
electrician, plumber or handyman could pay for ads in the yellow pages to 
help him get work, but he might also rely on client referrals and those client 
referrals might want to verify that he had a license affirming his capability 
to perform the task he was to be hired to complete.  Taxi drivers could 
invest huge sums and undertake substantial background screening per local 
laws to get a livery license that would allow them to pick up passengers — 
functioning as a franchise that followed branding and presentation 
standards set by a central entity, but the individual drivers controlled the 
minute operations on an individual basis. 
In any of these cases, vacation or illness meant missed income for the 
contractor, and he or she paid his or her own expenses and self-
employment taxes that fed into the social services he or she might one day 
need for support.  Such contractors invested much in their reputation and 
client satisfaction, because that could sometimes be more valuable than 
advertising in generating client business.  But they also assumed all of the 
risk of harm by their contracting actions, whether to themselves or others 
— after all, they were likely in sole control of the choices they made 
regarding how to perform the assigned task.  In sum, one had to have a 
personal reputation for competency to earn significant sums through 
independent contractor tasks. 
3. Jurisdictional Considerations for Worker Classification Issues 
The foregoing summary notwithstanding, it’s critical to note that the 
rules that govern whether a particular worker should be classified as an 
“employee” or an “independent contractor” vary depending on which 
statute, legal obligation, jurisdiction, and circumstances are at issue – in 
fact, the same person can be both an employee and an independent 
contractor of the same entity at the same time if engaged to perform 
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different functions.28  Rules exist at both the federal level, where they may 
come not only from the IRS and its Internal Revenue Code, as well as from 
other executive Departments (such as the Department of Labor) or federal 
statutes (such as ERISA),29 and at the state level, where such rules take the 
form of state statutes, state regulations, or rules/opinions of a specific state 
agency like an employment equality agency or labor commissioner.  This 
creates a complicated legal framework that is difficult to apply to new 
market circumstances as they arise, especially for early stage companies 
with no legal team. 
Even a legal advisor, however, might find it difficult to assess the 
application of these diverse rules to a novel circumstance.  A broad survey 
of such rules, regulations, cases, and agency opinions reveals that they 
overwhelmingly require a fact-specific, case-by-case determination of 
which classification should apply under the present circumstances — and a 
contractual agreement between the worker and the entity may be 
considered or disregarded by a court, as can the use of a W-2 (employee) 
tax form or a 1099 (contractor) tax filing by the entity on the individual 
worker’s behalf.30  In addition, these tests were, at least at the federal level, 
crafted in the 1980s, before the Internet was a commercial platform — 
arguably before it even existed.31  Unsurprisingly, these fact-specific tests 
do not provide clear guidance as to whether an internet-based startup 
should treat someone who performs any service in connection with the 
startup’s business as an employee or an independent contractor.  These 
 
 28.  See I.R.S., Information Letter No. 2012-0069 on Employees and Independent 
Contractors Under Internal Revenue Code Section 3121(d) (Dec. 28, 2012), http://www.irs.gov/ 
pub/irs-wd/12-0069.pdf. 
 29.  Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 
(1974). 
 30.  See generally Trosper v. Stryker Corp., No. 13-CV-0607-LHK, 2014 WL 1619052 
(N.D. Cal. Apr. 22, 2014); Yellow Cab Coop. v. Workers Comp. Appeals Bd., 226 Cal. App. 3d 
1288 (1991); Toyota Motor Sales v. Superior Court, 220 Cal. App. 3d 864, 877 (1990); I.R.S. 
Information Letter No. 2012-0069, supra note 28 (discussing how a particular individual can be 
both employee and contractor at the same time); I.R.S., DEP’T OF THE TREAS., Pub. 15-A, 
EMPLOYER’S SUPPLEMENTAL TAX GUIDE (2014), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p15a.pdf 
(explaining the considerations that apply to a classification); CAL. LAB. CODE § 3357 (Deering 
2015); CAL. LAB. CODE § 2802 (Deering 2015); Cal. Dep’t of Ind. Rel., Div. of Labor Standards 
Enforcement, Independent Contractor Versus Employee, http://www.dir.ca.gov/dlse/faq_ 
independentcontractor.htm (discussing the various California state agencies that may require 
classification).  For a summary of state and federal tests that may apply to classification, see 
Sutherland Asbill & Brennan LLP, Classification Tests (2015), http://www.workerclassification. 
com/Classification-Tests (noting certain instances where a state follows the IRS classification). 
 31.  See JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, JCX-26-07, PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND 
RELATING TO WORKER CLASSIFICATION FOR FEDERAL TAX PURPOSES (2007), http://www.irs. 
gov/pub/irs-utl/x-26-07.pdf. 
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tests also do not contemplate circumstances where a consumer might trust a 
stranger to provide a service because they trust a brand that doesn’t employ 
that person, nor do they contemplate circumstances where a trusted brand 
can contractually disclaim liability for that stranger’s actions.  They are 
consequently inapposite to the classification concerns of the on-demand 
economy. 
C. Application of Traditional Structures to Gig Platforms 
Today, many freelancers do still operate substantially as they did 30 
years ago — usually where they have specialized skills or a specific 
professional license.  There are still solo practice lawyers, cab drivers, 
plumbers, electricians, and they are still earning professional licenses, 
although they may now advertise in new ways, including through 
Contractor Marketplaces and otherwise over the Internet. 
However, many of the reputation-based and trust-based mechanisms 
that drove work to skilled freelancers in the old world have been assumed 
by Gig Platforms in order to connect unskilled freelancers with work in the 
new world in a way that disrupts the traditional way of doing business in 
that industry.  I refer to these unskilled freelancers who work on specific, 
platform defined gigs as “Giglancers” in this article. 
Where once you looked for a taxi company and livery license to give a 
ride and would never get into a stranger’s unmarked car for one, now 
thousands of people get into strangers’ personal cars everyday because they 
trust Lyft, Uber, or Sidecar to connect them with a safe ride at an agreed 
price.32  In San Francisco, before ride share apps like these evolved, I 
would regularly have conversations with taxi drivers about the issues with 
their work.  Why are there never enough cabs on the weekend but you guys 
always seem to available for hire during the week?  My taxi drivers 
explained that the city allowed only a set number of taxi licenses based on 
average demand — a number that was necessarily too high during the work 
week and far too low on Friday and Saturday.  Rideshare apps solved this 
problem by tying both compensation and worker engagement more directly 
to real-time demand and offering drivers incentives to do more during peak 
hours.33  But they still act franchise-like (as taxis do) in certain ways: they 
require a certain kind of car, that drivers keep it clean, and a certain level of 
 
 32.  This “imputed trust” phenomenon has been discussed previously with respect to both 
“rideshare” companies and some Marketplaces, like Airbnb.  See Jason Tanz, How Airbnb and 
Lyft Finally Got Americans to Trust Each Other, WIRED MAG., (Apr. 23, 2014), http://www. 
wired.com/2014/04/trust-in-the-share-economy/. 
 33.  Interview by Anita Wilhelm with Anonymous Lyft Driver (June 15, 2015). 
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city knowledge, a brand label on the outside of the car, a background 
check, etc.34 
Marketplaces and Contractor Marketplaces still effect transactions on 
the basis of the quality of the good or the seller/contractors’ reputations as 
old-world freelancers obtained work exclusively through their own (or a 
firm’s) reputation.  But in a Gig Platform, a freelancer can obtain work as a 
result of the reputation and consumer trust built by Gig Platform.  This 
“Giglancer” does not need specialized skills — the Gig Platform has 
defined the deliverable the end-user arrives to purchase, and that 
deliverable (a ride, a delivery in a set amount of time, a simple task to be 
performed) can come from any Giglancer that meets the platform criteria 
(e.g., have a clean car that’s not too old, a license, and an account with the 
platform).  In some — but not all — cases, Gig Platform reviews speak to 
the individual’s capability and performance according to the Gig Platform’s 
standards.  If demand suddenly increases (there’s a huge game!) the Gig 
Platform can increase incentives for Giglancers to show up at that time and 
meet demand.  Critically, Gig Platforms do not require any particular level 
of work or hours (though they may attempt to incentivize these); the 
worker on a Gig Platform not only has the opportunity to start and stop 
work anytime without penalty, but also the power to start and stop work for 
other Gig Platforms, including among direct competitors, at will. 
Service Platforms, by contrast, are much more like traditional 
employers in how they meet demand.  Their internal processes can 
predictably assess demand (i.e., it won’t be a surprise that shipping activity 
increases around the end of every year), so there’s a good reason for them 
to set up service-provider-workers in advance to reliably meet that demand.  
The service performed is chosen by the Service Platform, which gives the 
service providers very specific instructions.35  These service providers may 
be converted to employees once the Service Platform has systematized 
their response to marketplace demand.36 
Like Marketplace “accounts” or Contractor Marketplace “profiles,” 
both end-users and freelancers that connect through a Gig Platform create 
accounts with the Gig Platform.  Yet, like the rules surrounding who 
 
 34.  Berwick, No. 11-46739-EK, Cal. Lab. Comm’r (June 3, 2015). 
 35.  For an enterprise like Instacart, for example, shoppers are instructed to use certain 
“replacement items” if their ordered item is not available in the store.  See INSTACART, 
https://www.instacart.com/help/section/placing-an-order#204246964. 
 36.  For commentary on why this conversion might occur at a given time, see generally 
Connie Loizos, CEO Kevin Gibbon On Why Shyp Is Converting Its 1099 Workers Into W2 
Employees, TECHCRUNCH (July 1, 2015), http://techcrunch.com/2015/07/01/ceo-kevin-gibbon-
on-why-shyp-is-converting-its-1099-workers-into-w2-employees. 
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qualifies as which type of worker, the contractual case law governing the 
commercial relationship of an “account” on a Gig Platform are designed for 
a pre-Internet world, and their application to modern e-commerce thus far 
has been clunky. 
III. The Formation and Enforceability of Online Contracts 
A basic tenant in contract law holds that forming a contract requires 
an offer, acceptance (or another manifestation of mutual assent), 
consideration, and (in certain cases) a writing — yet the vast majority of 
contracts ever formed by Americans younger than 24 — online contracts 
— lacked at least some of these elements.37  Most of the time we visit an 
online article — and for some this can be hundreds of times per day — we 
are assumed to be agreeing to the terms and conditions of that website, 
even when we have trouble finding them.38 
I have previously written39 about the genesis of the modern law of 
online contracts, which arises from an exception to the unenforceability of 
contracts of adhesion in the context of purchase terms printed on a cruise 
ticket.40  The underlying theory of that foundational case was that the cruise 
operator could not conduct business if it were required to negotiate specific 
terms with each and every purchaser.  Over the next two and a half 
decades, courts have built off of this foundation to develop the law of 
“clickwrap,” “shrinkwrap,”41 and “browsewrap” agreements.42 
This overview of web terms’ enforceability is not presented to support 
a normative statement regarding whether courts have adopted the correct 
 
 37.  See Lindsay M. Howden & Julie A. Meyer, U.S. CENSUS. BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF 
COMM., C2010BR-03, AGE AND SEX COMPOSITION: 2010 (2011), http://www.census.gov/prod/ 
cen2010/briefs/c2010br-03.pdf. 
 38.  Consider, as just one example, this online version of Time magazine, where new article 
loads as you scroll to the end of the page where a lawyer like myself expects to find the terms — 
you could click article for hours on such sites and never locate the contract you’ve ostensibly 
agreed to with you visit.  As discussed infra, these terms may not be enforceable — but the 
website host is generally still assuming they are.  See Sarah Begley, Millions More Americans 
Will Qualify for Overtime, TIME MAG. (June 29, 2015), http://time.com/3490889/obama-
regulation-overtime. 
 39.  Jessica L. Hubley, How Concepcion Killed the Privacy Class Action, 28 SANTA CLARA 
HIGH TECH. L. J. 743, 749 (2011). 
 40.  See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 593-94 (1991). 
 41.  See Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 32 (2d Cir. 2002) (defining 
shrinkwrap agreements as license agreements contained within the shrinkwrap of a box 
containing a software product). 
 42.  See Hubley, supra note 39, at 749–57.  Shrinkwrap agreements are rare in 2015, as they 
are defined in connection with a delivery of software on a disk. 
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model for enforcing online contracts.43  It is simply to frame the diverse 
means by which the on-demand entities subject of this article establish 
contractual agreements with their users. 
The critical difference between “clickwrap” and “browsewrap” 
agreements is in the degree of notice and access to the contract terms a user 
has.  In sum, a “clickwrap” agreement “presents the user with a message on 
his or her computer screen, requiring that the user manifest his or her assent 
to the terms of the license agreement by clicking on an icon,” though the 
terms need not be present on the screen with that button.44  A browsewrap 
agreement requires no specific click-to-assent, and courts will “enforce 
inconspicuous browsewrap agreements only when there is evidence that the 
user has actual or constructive notice of the site’s terms.”45  Recently, the 
Ninth Circuit ruled that browsewrap terms present on every page of a site 
to which the user was never directed did not confer sufficient notice, 
without more, to establish contractual assent.46  Yet at least one federal 
court has found that a user who creates an account and effects a purchase 
under a browsewrap form and later enters a clickwrap agreement to access 
deliverables is bound by the clickwrap agreement notwithstanding the 
unenforceability of the browsewrap agreement.47  If a commercial 
relationship created by a clickwrap agreement is litigated today — that is, 
the contract terms were presented at least through a link in association with 
a specific user click — whether or not the contract is enforceable as a 
general matter is in some cases never mentioned in court opinions at all; the 
assumption is that the clickwrap terms will be enforceable.48 
 
 43.  For one example of such commentary, please see Edith R. Warkentine, Beyond 
Unconscionability: The Case for Using “Knowing Assent” as the Basis for Analyzing 
Unbargained-for Terms in Standard Form Contracts, 31 SEATTLE UNIV. L. REV. 469 (2008), 
http://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1056&context=sulr. 
 44.  Be In, Inc. v. Google Inc., No. 12–CV–03373–LHK, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147047, at 
*23 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2013) (citing Specht, 306 F.3dat 22 n. 4. (quotation and citation omitted)) 
(“mere use of a website” could not demonstrate users’ assent, and that the “mere existence of a 
link” failed to notify users of terms of service.”), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147047, at *33. 
 45.   Tompkins v. 23andMe, Inc., No. 5:13-CV-05682-LHK, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88068, 
at *22 (N.D. Cal. June 25, 2014) (citing Sw. Airlines Co. v. BoardFirst, L.L.C., No. 3:06–
CV0891–B, 2007 WL 4823761 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 12, 2007).; Mark A. Lemley, Terms of Use, 91 
MINN. L. REV. 459, 459–60 (2006)). 
 46.  See Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble Inc., 763 F.3d 1171, (9th Cir. 2014). 
 47.  See Tompkins, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88068 at *59 (noting that plaintiff’s challenging 
the enforcement of an arbitration provision had established procedural unconscionability in light 
of the first browsewrap presentation, but not substantive unconscionability). 
 48.  See, e.g., Perkins v. LinkedIn Corp., 53 F. Supp. 3d 1190 (N.D. Cal. 2014).  Note, 
however, that the scope of consent provided through the language in such terms is still litigated.  
See, e.g., In re Google, Inc. Privacy Policy Litig., No. 12–1382, 2012 WL 6738343, at *5 (N.D. 
Cal. Dec. 28, 2012). 
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IV. Contractual Distinctions and Similarities among  
On-Demand Entities 
The user agreement terms (“surveyed terms”) applicable to both 
consumers and providers through on-demand entities were surveyed and 
are provided below.  Of the six sample entities surveyed (three Gig 
Platforms and one each of Marketplaces, Contractor Marketplaces, and 
Service Platforms), all presented online contracts to users that governed 
users’ behavior and use of the applicable software.49  Users, like on-
demand economy workers, who click-to-enter these contracts have no 
practical means of challenging their enforcement, and therefore are bound 
by strict limits upon platform liability and their own rights. 
A. A Survey of Common Platform terms 
The surveyed terms have some commonalities.  Each of the surveyed 
terms is activated (i.e., assent is deemed given) upon any use of the 
services or platform.  Each of the surveyed terms includes a broad 
copyright license for the entity to use user data) (whether input or 
collected).50  In theory, this would give the entity the copyright licenses 
 
 49.  See following online terms: Terms and Conditions, UBER, https://www.uber.com/legal/ 
ind/terms (last visited July 4, 2015) [hereinafter Uber Terms]; Terms of Service, LYFT, 
https://www.lyft.com/terms (last visited July 4, 2015) [hereinafter Lyft Terms]; Terms of Service, 
TASKRABBIT, https://www.taskrabbit.com/terms, (last visited July 4, 2015) [hereinafter 
TaskRabbit Terms]; Terms and Conditions, INCLOUDCOUNSEL, https://www.incloudcounsel. 
com/terms (last visited July 4, 2015) [hereinafter InCloudCounsel Terms]; Terms of Use, ETSY, 
https://www.etsy.com/help/article/479 (last visited July 4, 2015) [hereinafter Etsy Terms]; Terms 
of Service, SHYP, http://www.shyp.com/terms (last visited July 4, 2015) [hereinafter Shyp 
Terms).  Collectively I refer to these agreements in this article as the “Surveyed Terms.” 
 50.  See Uber Terms supra (“We may, in our sole discretion, permit Users to post, upload, 
publish, submit or transmit User Content on the Website or through the Service or 
ApplicationFalse User Content will be deemed non-confidential and non-proprietary. 
Accordingly, Uber shall have the non-exclusive, royalty-free, right to use, copy, distribute and 
disclose to third parties any User Content for any purpose, in any medium and throughout the 
world”); Lyft Terms supra (“To enable the Lyft Platform to use your Information, you grant to us 
a non-exclusive, worldwide, perpetual, irrevocable, royalty-free, sub-licensable (through multiple 
tiers) right and license to exercise the copyright, publicity, and database rights you have in your 
Information, and to use, copy, perform, display and distribute such Information to prepare 
derivative works, or incorporate into other works, such Information, in any media now known or 
not currently known”); Taskrabbit Terms supra (“You hereby grant Company a non-exclusive, 
worldwide, perpetual, irrevocable, royalty-free, sublicensable (through multiple tiers) right to 
exercise all copyright, publicity rights, and any other rights you have in Your Information, in any 
media now known or not currently known in order to perform and improve upon the Service.”); 
InCloudCounsel Terms supra (“You grant InCloud a perpetual, irrevocable, royalty-free, 
transferable right and license to use, copy, modify, delete in its entirety, adapt, publish, translate, 
create derivative works from, sell, distribute, and/or incorporate such content into any form, 
medium, or technology throughout the world without compensation to you. You have the right to 
remove any of your works from User Content at any time.”); Etsy Terms supra (“You grant Etsy 
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necessary to, for example, show the profile picture a user uploads to other 
users.  In practice, unless there is some limitation elsewhere in an entity’s 
contracts, the broad language through which this is achieved might be used 
for other purposes, as well.  For example, Uber saw a press backlash after 
the revelation that it had a “God View” in which individual users were 
tracked at launch parties by name, though no lawsuit was filed over the 
practice as of the date of this paper.51 
Whether users are bound by these form contracts also depends upon 
the means of assent.  Among the surveyed terms, all but Uber present a link 
to the terms and conditions near the point of account creation, and 
therefore, as explained supra, all the non-Uber surveyed terms are likely 
enforceable.  Even though Uber does not present end-user terms as a 
clickwrap agreement, a swift product change implementing the court-
recognized assent procedure and a forced re-login by all users could 
probably render the Uber terms enforceable to the extent they are not 
now.52  For purposes of this article, therefore, I’ll assume Uber’s counsel is 
busy on other matters and will implement this industry-standard practice 
soon, and therefore I treat all of the surveyed terms as though they are 
enforceable under current law for purposes of this analysis. 
In sum, while some major online platforms still reflect a browsewrap-
like model, most of the commonly known apps and websites discussed here 
have adopted a clickwrap model — which means users have little chance, 
 
a license solely to enable Etsy to use any information or Content you supply Etsy with, so that 
Etsy is not violating any rights you might have in that Content.  You grant Etsy a non-exclusive, 
worldwide, perpetual, irrevocable, royalty-free, sublicensable (through multiple tiers) right to 
exercise the copyright, publicity, and database rights (but no other rights) you have in the 
Content, in any media now known or not currently known, with respect to your Content.  You 
agree to allow Etsy to store, translate, or re-format your Content on Etsy and display your Content 
on Etsy in any way Etsy chooses. Etsy will only use personal information in accordance with 
Etsy’s Privacy Policy.”); Shyp Terms supra (“By posting Your Content on or through the 
Service, you hereby do and shall grant Shyp a worldwide, non-exclusive, perpetual, irrevocable, 
royalty-free, fully paid, sublicensable and transferable license to use, modify, reproduce, 
distribute, display, publish and perform, Your Content in connection with the Service and to 
improve Shyp’s products and services, subject to the terms and conditions of this TOS and our 
Privacy Policy.  Shyp has the right, but not the obligation, to monitor the Service, Content, or 
Your Content and to disclose your Your Content if required to do so by law or in the good faith 
belief that such action is necessary to (i) comply with a legal obligation, (ii) protect and defend 
the rights or property of Shyp, (iii) act in urgent circumstances to protect the personal safety of 
users of the Services or the public, or (iv) protect against legal liability.”) 
 51.  See Kashmir Hill, ‘God View’: Uber Allegedly Stalked Users For Party-Goers’ Viewing 
Pleasure (Updated), FORBES (Oct. 3, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2014/10/03/ 
god-view-uber-allegedly-stalked-users-for-party-goers-viewing-pleasure/. 
 52.  See Tompkins, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88068 at *19-23. 
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absent fraud in the execution,53 of challenging the formation of a contract 
between user or provider and platform. 
B. Survey of Limitations of Liability (Appendix A) 
As with most sophisticated e-commerce platforms, each of the 
Surveyed Terms limits the entity’s liability.  They do so both through caps 
on monetary damages and through exclusions of other categories of 
damages, in a manner subject of the chart attached as Exhibit A.  All but 
the Uber terms disclaim all liability that can be legally disclaimed in 
connection with the use of the service (Uber instead caps its liability at 
€500 (approximately about US$526) and disclaims liability other than for 
its gross negligence or willful misconduct, but notably the contract is 
promulgated under the laws of the Netherlands). 
Each platform or marketplace discussed herein has also included brisk 
limits on that platform or marketplaces’ liability to the end user — whether 
that end user is a 1099 service provider using the platform to find income 
or a consumer looking to buy goods or services through the platform. 
C. Survey of Warranty Disclaimers (Appendix B) 
Differences begin to emerge when we look specifically at how 
surveyed terms disclaim warranty obligations and/or offer a limited 
performance warranty.  While language choices vary and have slightly 
different legal force, it is clear that all four types of web-based entities 
make a point to disclaim not only traditional implied commercial 
warranties, but also any warranties that might be implied as to the quality 
of the deliverable on the platform.  For an entity like Etsy, who seeks no 
control over what sellers list on its marketplace, effectively disclaiming its 
responsibility for the ultimate quality of the goods sold over the platform, 
reflects that Etsy does not control what goods are placed on the platform 
for sale, nor how they are positioned for users.  Etsy has otherwise required 
prospective purchasers to acknowledge and agree to this.  Gig Platforms 
Uber, Lyft, and Taskrabbit have much greater control over the way that the 
desired gig is performed, but use the click-through form to eliminate the 
implied warranties that might otherwise apply. 
D. Survey of Indemnity Obligations (Appendix C) 
The surveyed terms impose indemnities and/or hold harmless clauses — 
that is, contractual mechanisms to require one party to assume certain 
liability that may be incurred by the other — users’ use of the applicable 
 
 53.  See Hubley, supra note 39, at 764-67. 
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website or application.  The surveyed terms uniformly require indemnity 
coverage (i.e., the end user is responsible for damages) where the terms 
have been breached, and most also impose responsibility on the user for the 
user’s violation of the law or third party rights.  The Gig Platforms and the 
Service Platform specifically impose an indemnity clause for claims arising 
from ones “use of the service,” whereas the surveyed Marketplace and 
Contractor Marketplace do not.54 
V. Gig Platforms, Incentives, and Absurdities 
By organizing the types of on-demand entities operating in the 
marketplace today into the four above categories: 1) Marketplaces where 
goods or property are sold on behalf of third party owners, 2) Contractor 
Marketplaces where skilled workers can be engaged for unspecified tasks 
by thirds parties, 3) Gig Platforms where specified tasks can be performed 
for end-users by service providers with schedule flexibility but not gig 
flexibility, and 4) Service Platforms where third parties arrive to ask for a 
specific task at a specific time and place — a road to more efficient legal 
treatment emerges. 
Comparing the worker classification factors promulgated by the IRS55 
with the common law opinions in recent class-actions decisions against 
Uber and Lyft,56 a few common considerations come to light; courts and 
regulators grapple with when deciding how to classify any particular 
worker.  In addition, I have identified a few related economic drivers and 
mapped how each category of on-demand entity relates to these.  These 
charted values include: 
 
x What is the basis for the demand of what is transacted on the 
entity’s software platform? 
 
 54.  While an attorney drafting terms will use his or her discretion in identifying relevant 
areas of risk for a client and treatment is not necessarily uniform among entities of the four types 
surveyed herein, it is likely that Etsy (Marketplace) and InCloudCounsel (Contractor 
Marketplace) do not state a user indemnity for “use of the service” because other provisions of 
their user agreements govern predictable, recurring platform marketplace actions.  These actions 
can be defined and outlined in the user agreement such that breach of the user agreement 
effectively gives the entity indemnity coverage for anything arising from user’s actions on the 
platform.  By contrast, a Gig Platform or Service Platform does not have the ability to outline in 
advance all of the potential use actions of its users and therefore usually cannot disclaim all 
relevant liabilities by simply requiring an indemnity for noncompliance with its online terms. 
 55.  See Worker Classification, supra, note 31. 
 56.  See O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., Case No. 3:13-cv-03826-EMC, 2015 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 30684 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2015); Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., Case No. 3:13-cv-04065-VC, 2015 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30026 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2015). 
6 - HUBLEY_ONLINECONSENT-EDITED-PROD-FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/13/2015  3:35 PM 
WINTER 2016]        ONLINE CONSENT AND THE ON-DEMAND COMMUNITY 21 
x How predictable are changes in demand for the entity? 
x How the worker creates services, or affects the demand 
serviced by the entity — in other words, is the worker’s task 
central to the operations of the entity or tangential to those 
operations? 
x To what extent is the entity’s business operation or changes 
result in the unemployment of workers? 
x Would vicarious liability traditionally attach for worker 
actions in the scope of the services designed for the platform, 
absent clickwrap disclaimers? 
x Would workers compensation responsibility traditionally 
attach given the degree of entity control over the means of 
performance, absent clickwrap disclaimers? 57 
x Who has control over which hours the worker works? 
x Who has control over the workflow presented or offered to the 
worker? 
x Who has control of the means of performance of work tasks? 
 
A diagram summarizing the answer to each of these for each of the 
four On-Demand categories is attached as Appendix D.  Diagramed as 
such, it’s clear that Gig Platforms mimic employer-employee relationships 
at times, and they mimic independent contractor-entity relationships at 
times. 
A. Where Gig Platforms Align with Marketplaces 
Gig Platforms behave like Marketplaces or Contractor Marketplaces 
in connection with their identification and satisfaction of market demands.  
Like Marketplaces and Contractor Marketplaces, demand for what the 
platform provides is elastic and unpredictable — these entities are reliant 
on past usage to roughly estimate future demand, but this process is 
necessarily imperfect.  None of these entities can really limit what work a 
worker chooses to accept elsewhere.58  By contrast, on a Service Platform, 
 
 57.  This is another creature of both state and federal law.  Under the Social Security Act of 
1935 and the Federal Unemployment Tax Act, Federal guidelines drive state-specific programs – 
all of which, at core, are targeted to keep skilled workers afloat at their previous income level for 
a limited period of time in which they can find other work applicable to their skillset, with the 
expectation that their sustained spending is good for the economy (for a high-level overview, see 
Unemployment Compensation Law: An Overview, LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE, https:// 
www.law.cornell.edu/wex/unemployment_compensation).  However, where the work performed 
is not skilled, the underlying justification for unemployment payments falls apart. 
 58.  More specifically, while a solo practice attorney may sell services through a Contractor 
Marketplace as well as finding clients in the traditional way (based on reputation or referrals) and 
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the entity reliably predicts (or has already recorded) the demand before 
engaging workers to meet it.  Like Marketplace and Contractor 
Marketplaces, Gig Platforms cannot require the participation of any given 
service provider at any given time — they do not control the hours that 
worker chooses to work.  They can offer incentives to work at predictably 
busy times, but they cannot require anyone to show up on the day the work 
appears. As such, their ability to respond to an uptick in demand (and 
therefore their ability to profit from that unusual uptick) is limited. 
In addition, Gig Platforms presently require workers to pay their own 
expenses, which seems reasonable if you consider that, as with a 
Marketplace, they have no way of ensuring that their expenditures on 
worker business expenses would actually be used for their business.  A car 
might be used to perform a TaskRabbit task, to drive for Uber, or to drive 
for Lyft — all in the same day. 
B. Where Gig Platforms Align with Service Platforms 
Gig Platforms behave like Service Platforms in their control of task 
minutiae.  Both Platforms fully dictate the quality, timing, and nature of the 
services, or task to be performed, — In other words, characteristics of the 
task or service are chosen and fixed by the platform and do not vary 
according to the service provider.  Both choose the means by which work is 
distributed, how work is compensated, the manner in which work is 
performed if, and when it is accepted by the worker. 
A Giglancer or service provider on a Service Platform, who is hurt 
while performing within the scope of the Gig or Platform service, as 
instructed by the platform, would be the classic recipient of worker’s 
compensation insurance under traditional theories.59  The common policy 
reasoning behind workers compensation is that, where an employee accepts 
the task of knowing what it will entail and having to perform it as the entity 
instructs, and the employer is in the best position vis-à-vis the employee to 
be familiar with industry pitfalls.  Therefore, the employer should assume 
 
sellers on Etsy or eBay may use other Marketplaces (online or physical) to sell their own goods, 
Giglancers often take gigs from multiple Gig Platforms.  Some surveys suggest as many as 60% 
of drivers in a city where both Uber and Lyft take driving gigs from both competitors. See Josh 
Waldrum, Uber vs. Lyft: 5 Things I Learned From Giving Up My Car, THE ZEBRA, https://www. 
thezebra.com/insurance-news/848/uber-vs-lyft/; or, for an example of individual commentary 
about working for both Gig Platforms, see J. Money, Side Hustle Series #52: I’m a Lyft Driver 
and Uber Driver, BUDGETS ARE SEXY (Sept. 3, 2014), http://www.budgetsaresexy.com/2014/ 
09/lyft-uber-driver-hustle/.  It’s not clear precisely how often this happens (and it is reasonable to 
expect the number of people working for more than one Gig Platform at a time changes almost 
daily), but it is clear that it happens. 
 59.  See Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble Inc., 763 F.3d 1171 (9th Cir. 2014). 
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the costs of the workers risk.  For this reason, foreign national 
governments, and U.S. States began to adopt laws that replaced tort-based 
dispute resolution with automated worker compensation payments for 
injuries sustained in the course of performing the task of employment 
within the scope of employment.60 
The same logic can be applied to the issue of whether respondeat 
superior61 liability should attach to Gig Platforms: Where the Giglancer is 
following instructions and/or within the scope of the gig, the entity is 
probably in the best position to avoid the harm and/or minimize the damage 
from that task, and is ultimately profiting from the risky behavior it has the 
opportunity to avoid.  At present, the surveyed terms disclaim any such 
liability and frequently require an indemnity from both end-users and 
workers for the kind of tort claims that might be subject to respondeat 
superior liability were the tortfeasor an employee. 
C. What Makes Gig Platforms Unique 
Unique questions apply to Giglancers working through Gig Platforms. 
What about injuries sustained or inflicted while in-between gigs?  What 
about expenses for things used in a gig and for other purposes?  After all, 
the Gig Platforms don’t instruct workers as to what to do in between gigs, 
so they don’t know and cannot control the actions that might cause (or 
prevent) injury.  In a Marketplace, there is no clear delineation between 
“on” time and “off” time; the goods sold or services performed are 
generally unique, there is no common expense that the Marketplace could 
 
 60.  See Gregory P. Guyton, A Brief History of Worker’s Compensation, 19 IOWA ORTHOP. 
J. 106, (1999), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1888620/  (“The 
central tenet is that of “no-fault” insurance; industrial accidents are accepted as a fact of life and 
the system exists to deal with their financial consequences in as expeditious a manner as 
possible.”); see also id. at n.7. Compare unemployment insurance/taxes, another creature of both 
state and federal law.  Under the Social Security Act of 1935 and the Federal Unemployment Tax 
Act, Federal guidelines drive state-specific programs — all of which, at core, are targeted to keep 
skilled workers afloat at their previous income level for a limited period of time in which they can 
find other work applicable to their skillset, with the expectation that their sustained spending is 
good for the economy (for a high-level overview, see Unemployment  Compensation Law, supra 
note 57.  However, where the work performed is not skilled, the underlying justification for 
unemployment payments falls apart.  Since Giglancers don’t perform skilled tasks, I disregard 
unemployment protections for purposes of this article. 
 61.  A core tenet of tort law wherein an employer is deemed liable for actions of its 
employees within the scope of their employment. As an example of a state implementing law, see 
CAL. CIV. CODE § 2338 (West 2015) (“Unless required by or under the authority of law to 
employ that particular agent, a principal is responsible to third persons for the negligence of his 
agent in the transaction of the business of the agency, including wrongful acts committed by such 
agent in and as a part of the transaction of such business, and for his willful omission to fulfill the 
obligations of the principal.”). 
HUBLEY_ONLINECONSENT_MACROED (DO NOT DELETE) 11/13/2015 3:35 PM 
24 HASTINGS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol 8:1 
provide. Service Platforms, by contrast, will engage workers62 when they 
can meet predictable demand for services (e.g., shipping services), so there 
is not generally “between” time to consider. 
This “between gigs” (effectively, between accepting instructions and 
performing the task) time is unique to the Gig Platform.  It does not only 
create a period of ambiguity as to which body of public policy (employee 
vs. independent contractor) should apply, but it also allows Giglancers to 
use tools in service of multiple constituents (or on their own behalf) on the 
same days and/or at the same times as they use them in the gig. 
D. Where the Clickwrap Structure Falters 
In 2015, courts in California63 and Florida, refused to observe the 
contractual terms of Giglancers and Gig Platforms reached by way of a 
click-through agreement in the context of employment law.64  By allowing 
cases against Gig Platforms to proceed beyond summary judgment upon 
claims that are expressly barred in the online terms (or, for which liability 
is technically placed on the worker/user by such terms), these suits have 
showed a limited space where at least some clickwrap terms are treated as 
unenforceable. 
The work done in surveyed terms, summarized supra, to specifically 
disclaim certain kinds of liability is therefore, thrown into question.  While 
there is no clear guidance as to how a court would treat claims against Gig 
Platforms under certain circumstances, there is clearly potential harm to 
users and Giglancers that might arise from using a Gig Platform.  Recent 
press has reported allegations of property damage, assault, and rape by on-
demand workers on Gig Platforms.65 
 
 62.  Admittedly, some service platforms begin their business life with workers as 
contractors.  They do generally shift to classifying workers as employees (which is appropriate 
given the analysis here) for compliance purposes. 
 63.  See Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067 (N.D. Cal. 2015); see also Berwick v. Uber 
Techs., Inc., Labor Comm’n Case No. 11-46739-EK (June 3, 2015). 
 64.  See Cotter, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 1074.  Note that these cases also appear to disregard 
arbitration provisions in such terms. 
 65.  Consider the following incidents from recent news (this article does not seek to assess 
whether any of the following allegations are true, but rather demonstrate that they exist to be 
adjudicated by our legal system): 
- Rideshare app drivers reporting damage to their cars from intoxicated passengers. 
- Rideshare app driver allegedly stabbed in the face. Joe Fitzgerald Rodriguez, Stabbed 
Uber Driver Files Class-Action Lawsuit Against Tech Company, THE EXAMINER (May 3, 
2015), http://archives.sfexaminer.com/sanfrancisco/stabbed-uber-driver-files-class-action-
lawsuit-against-tech-company/Content?oid=2928834. 
- Rideshare app driver falsely accused of rape and had trouble paying his lawyer. Steve 
Schmadeke, Rape Charge Dropped Against Former Uber Driver, CHICAGO TRIBUNE 
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True or not, each of these allegations purportedly occurred within the 
scope and in the course of a gig taken from a Gig Platform.  The Uber 
and/or Lyft terms put the liability for such alleged actions on the user/and 
or the driver, neither of whom is likely to have the spare change to either, 
employ a lawyer, litigate, or defend litigation — unlike a traditional large 
employer.  Gig Platforms, where successful, are the party with the most 
potential control over the behavior of the end user and the service provider.  
Uber is the only party in a position to force the video and/or audio 
recording of an Uber trips for use as evidence, as Lyft is for Lyft trips.  
Taskrabbit is in a better position than either any tasker or any end user to 
implement safety checks through photos. 
Recall that vicarious liability principles were crafted with pre-internet 
drivers on mind.  Traditional independent contractors secured business on 
the basis of their own reputation, while traditional employees secured 
income based on the employer’s reputation and the business the employer 
secured as a result.  Thus, the employer was liable for actions of employees 
while profiting from control over those actions.  Each Gig Platform is 
profiting on the basis of a market assumption that it is a trustworthy place 
to have a certain kind of gig fulfilled, and that the Gig Platforms set rules 
workers must follow to try to maximize that chances of a satisfactory 
placement of such trust and the resulting platform profits.  Yet Gig 
Platforms’ contracts still put all the responsibility for that placement, the 
underlying trustworthiness, and the performance of what they command on 
the shoulders of users and workers.  The courts in Cotter66 and Berwick67 
have begun to lift certain obligations off those individual shoulders on 
public policy grounds. However, they have yet to touch of the issue of 
vicarious liability.  The opportunity is ripe to design a broader solution that 
puts the responsibility for the breach of consumer trust on the entity, which 
is profiting from that trust. 
 
 
(Apr. 6, 2015, 6:51 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-uber-
driver-rape-charge-dropped-met-20150406-story.html. 
- Rideshare app driver allegedly raping drunk passenger in his home. Dug Begley, Uber 
Driver Accused of Rape Did Not Have City Permit, HOUSTON CHRONICLE (Apr. 6, 2015, 
9:09 PM), http://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/transportation/article/Uber-driver-
accused-of-rape-not-permitted-by-city-6182503.php. 
- College student at USC who blacked out allegedly told her Rideshare app that driver had 
raped her. Tracy Bloom, Uber Investigating After USC Student Accuses Driver of Rape, 
KTLA 5 (May 1, 2015, 8:28 AM), http://ktla.com/2015/05/01/usc-student-accuses-car-
service-driver-of-rape/. 
 66. See Cotter, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 1078. 
 67. See, e.g., Berwick, Labor Comm’n No. 11-46739-EK. 
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VI. A Proposed Legislative Solution 
Calls for a “third classification” or “third category” (i.e., besides 
independent contractor and employee) have come from various corners 
over the past year.68  From within such cries emerge two polar concerns: 
(1) will regulating these entities stifle innovation and (2) will not regulating 
these entities abuse citizens who should be offered certain employment 
benefits. 
First, this is a false dichotomy.  These entities are not “unregulated” 
now.  They are subject to a set of laws governing worker treatment whether 
they refer to those workers as “employees” or “contractors.”  Whichever 
they choose, they will have to file a form (W-2, 1099-MISC, 1099-K, etc.) 
with the IRS each year.  They will still have default legal obligations, albeit 
they will have more concrete, broader ones with respect to employees 
versus contractors.  Satisfying marketplace cries to create a “new category” 
would not necessarily mean introducing regulation where there was none 
before.  It might mean removing a legal exception that perhaps never 
should have applied to Gig Platforms. 
Under normal circumstances, a “contractor” will have much greater 
flexibility to outline his or her liability and work deliverables in an 
independent contractor engagement.  In software development contracts, 
for example, the parties tend to choose indemnities, limitations of liability, 
and warranty disclaimers tailored to the task at hand.69  This is in contrast 
to employees, who are presented with an employment agreement that is 
usually non-negotiable.  Gig Platforms, which set the non-negotiable rules 
of the platform and give instructions to both service providers and users, 
are in the best position to monitor their own Platform for wrongdoing. They 
control exactly how work will be performed and choose the compensation 
level for that work.  The work they aggregate can be performed without 
special skills — where worker supply is high, pay is generally lower, and 
 
 68.  Noah Lang, Employee or Contractor? Online Businesses Like Uber Need a New 
Category, NEWSWEEK (June 21, 2015, 4:14 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/employee-or-
contractor-online-businesses-uber-need-new-category-345082; Lauren Weber, What If There 
Were a New Type of Worker? Dependent Contractor, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 28, 2015, 10:28 AM), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/what-if-there-were-a-new-type-of-worker-dependent-contractor-142 
2405831; Tristan Zier, Could Creating a New Class Of Worker Solve The Sharing Economy’s 
Labor Problems?, FASTCOMPANY (June 19, 2015, 8:25 AM), http://www.fastcoexist.com/3 
047617/could-creating-a-new-class-of-worker-solve-the-sharing-economys-labor-problems; 
Connie Loizos, A Third Classification of Worker? Don’t Count On It, TECHCRUNCH (July 2, 
2015), http://techcrunch.com/2015/07/02/a-third-classification-of-worker-dont-count-on-it/?ncid= rss. 
 69.  This generalization is drawn from my own experience representing contract software 
developers as well as common legal practice surrounding such contracts. 
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the public policy justifications for things like workers’ compensation and 
minimum wage are strongest. 
The IRS 1099 forms can better reflect our digital reality.  A new set of 
1099 forms can establish the status of Platform and Marketplace 
participants.70  Existing forms that include a 1099-K where payments were 
routed through a marketplace or services marketplace can remain where 
they make great sense for marketplaces and contractor marketplaces, who 
do really just serve as payment processors.  A 1099-MISC where a 
uniquely skilled worker performed a one-off task defined by its deliverable 
and was paid more than $600, can continue to work for those with unique 
skills, who trade on their own reputations.  I propose this class of tax 
reporting forms should also include a “1099-GIG” to report income a 
Giglancer has been paid by a Gig Platform.71 
The proposed 1099-GIG would be the only one of these forms that 
does not presume the traditional independent contractor relationship under 
all circumstances.  It would instead be created by a federal statute (which 
would preempt state employment laws, etc.).  That federal statute would (1) 
distribute some worker’s compensation liability to the Gig Platforms, (2) 
impose some vicarious liability on the Gig Platforms, (3) impose anti-
discrimination laws upon the hiring and firing of Giglancers, (4) allow the 
Gig Platforms to avoid application of wage and hour laws to the 1099-GIG 
worker, (5) allow the Gig Platform to require the Giglancer to cover some 
selected expenses as long as those expenses were disclosed in advance of 
engagement, and (6) contemplate a grace period, as with the ACA, such 
that the applicable worker’s compensation and vicarious liability laws 
wouldn’t kick in until a certain number of “1099-GIG” were engaged.  For 
example, none of these legislative exceptions and conditions would be 
effective until an entity filed its 50th 1099-GIG in a single tax year.  This 
would allow early stage companies to avoid costs in the same way that has 
supported the growth of the on demand economy to date.  Each of these 
statutory mechanisms is discussed in turn as a means to protect the 
innovation enabled by the 1099 contractor classification, while also serving 
the public policy goals employment laws were designed to serve.  In 
addition, rather than the status quo — where Gig Platforms have a 
disincentive to provide or subsidize health, life, or disability insurance for 
 
 70.  Note that any of the 1099 forms will require the entity to obtain the social security 
number or Employer Identification Number of the individual contractor, so to do the same for 
other 1099 forms would not create an additional burden on startup businesses. 
 71.  There may also be reason to use a “1099-P” where a Contractor Marketplace transmits 
user’s payments to those who perform unique tasks and would be 1099-MISCs but withholds a 
commission. 
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workers for fear they will be reclassified as employees, an updated system 
could require that the provision of such benefits be ignored in any 
reclassification analysis.   In other words, whether or not Uber and Lyft 
elected to pay for a part of drivers’ health insurance premiums, standing 
alone, would not create a risk of reclassification.72 
Critically, any such statute should impose such obligations regardless 
of any click-wrapped contract terms used to establish the relationships 
between the Giglancer, Gig Platform, and consumer.  The genesis of click-
through enforceability was in the context of a software license,73 not an 
agreement for personal services.  We should instead use the kind of 
contract law applied to agreements for personal services to govern the 
relationships of Giglancers and Gig Platforms.  I submit that it is sensible 
to impose public policy limits on contractual obligations of a Giglancer in 
the same way our laws limit employment agreements’ enforceability, and 
that we can do that through the above-outlined statute by referencing 
existing state employment laws that supersede employment contracts in the 
marketplace today. 
A. Workers Compensation Liability for Gigs 
Gig Platforms have extensive control over most aspects of the Gig 
itself, but never whether or how much the Giglancer elects to work on a 
given day.74  Gig Platforms do not — and cannot — prohibit a Giglancer 
from taking work elsewhere, including from competitors.  I submit that Gig 
Platforms’ liability to workers for injuries sustained on the job arise only 
when the Giglancer is performing the task for that Gig Platform within the 
scope of any Gig Platform instructions — in the moments when the Gig 
Platform has control over the Giglancer that mirrors control it would have 
over an employee, and when the Gig Platform is tapping its main revenue 
stream through the worker’s labor.  For example, a Giglancer on the 
 
 72.  Note that the IRS has declared that an employers’ paying individual market premiums 
does not meet the requirement that employers provide “Minimum Essential Coverage” under the 
ACA.  See I.R.S. Notice 2013-54 (Sept. 13, 2013).  This is despite the fact that Qualified Health 
Plans on the individual market meet the requirements promulgated for employer’s “Minimum 
Essential Coverage.”   One might argue that this structure unfairly prejudices smaller business 
with less negotiating leverage, or that it harms the public because health insurers can discriminate 
based on pre-existing conditions in the small group market.   I hypothesize that the illogical result 
of IRS Notice 2013-54 arises from the IRS’ desire to avoid employers using federal subsidies to 
help pay for employees’ care.  If this is indeed a concern, Gig Platforms could additionally be 
required to pay their share (i.e., the percentage of Giglancer income that originates with that Gig 
Platform) of the applicable individual’s federal health insurance subsidy. 
 73.  See Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns. Corp., 306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 74.  This is true, although they may provide incentives to well-reviewed workers in order to 
try to get them working more. 
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Taskrabbit platform who drops a hammer on his foot and breaks it while 
performing a gig that will make both himself and Taskrabbit money (but 
will drive a customer to use Taskrabbit rather than his individual services 
again), gets whatever worker’s compensation would be available to 
employees under state laws.  By contrast, a 1099-GIG worker for both 
Uber and Lyft hurt by an exploding gas canister while refilling, would be 
treated as an independent contractor; he could not recover from either Gig 
Platform by virtue of his 1099-GIG filing from those platforms because he 
was outside of the scope of work for either Gig. 
B. Vicarious Liability for Gig Platforms 
Gig Platforms profit by advertising, to acquire public trust, in their 
ability to deliver the specified Gig safely and to customers’ satisfaction.  If 
that trust is a core reason for the sustainability of a business — as it must 
be with a Gig Platform – the entity should not be able to simultaneously 
profit from that trust and disclaim responsibility for breaking that trust.  For 
example, Uber and Lyft were sued on December 2014, by the Los Angeles 
District attorney, who argues they “misrepresent and exaggerate” the 
quality of their background checks on their drivers.75  Yet their surveyed 
terms would make the alleged crimes and torts occurring on the platform 
discussed supra (rape, stabbings, etc.) the responsibility of drivers and 
users alone.  The Gig Platforms currently disclaim all of this liability. 
I submit, therefore, that the proposed legislation requires courts to 
apply the laws of vicarious liability applicable to employees to 1099-GIG 
contractors acting within the scope of their Gig and/or pursuant to a Gig 
Platform’s instructions.  If an Uber driver picks up a passenger and assaults 
her rather than driving her to her destination, Uber would be subject to civil 
liability to the passenger in addition to the assaulting driver’s personal 
criminal liability.  In addition, if a crime or tort is enabled by the Gig 
Platform, the Gig Platform would be vicariously liable (for example, if a 
driver uses a rideshare app trip to know a passenger would be out of town 
and subsequently burgles the house where he picked her up).76  One can 
imagine how the threat of such liability would motivate larger enterprises 
to implement additional safety mechanisms (such as the video cameras that 
already operate in taxi cabs at all times) and/or more extensive screening of 
 
 75.   See Associated Press, California Sues Uber Over Background Checks; Lyft Settles, 
BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 10, 2014, http://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2014/12/10/california-
sues-uber-over-background-checks-lyft-settles/YzQlr4ZUm9H4aGOGzeJNmJ/story.html. 
 76.  Tara Fowler, Uber Driver Allegedly Drove Woman to Airport, Then Went Back to Rob 
Her Home, PEOPLE, Apr. 1, 2015, http://www.people.com/article/uber-driver-arrested-attempted-
burglary. 
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Giglancers, which will increase public safety.  By contrast, if a Lyft driver 
exited his car and began beating a man on the street,77 Lyft would not be 
liable because he was outside of the scope of his Gig. 
In addition, states would be free to impose particular insurance 
requirements, as California has.78  If the IRS had created the 1099-G 
category, new insurance and public policy regulations could more directly 
target the actors they seek to regulate. 
C. Removing Wage and Hour Laws for Giglancers 
Because the Giglancer can choose how much to work and when to do 
it, there is less need for Depression-era protections of mandatory work 
breaks.  Because Giglancers are free to shift between Gig Platforms if the 
economics of one Gig Platform no longer allow them to make sufficient 
income, there is no traditional justification for minimum wage laws or 
unemployment insurance schemes to apply to Giglancers.79  Because Gigs 
are available to the same workers on multiple Gig Platforms at once, the 
danger of finding oneself without income because of the corporate 
restructuring, downsizing, or closing of one Gig Platform is minimal.  
Because the traditional justifications for wage, hour, and unemployment 
laws are not applicable to Giglancer circumstances, the proposed 
legislation would require courts to treat Giglancers as independent 
contractors when applying these laws. 
D. Removing Expense Reimbursement Rules for Giglancers 
Because a Giglancer may use the same possession in performance of 
gigs for multiple Gig Platforms, it would not make much sense to require 
Uber to cover the cost of a car and gas that is also used to help its main 
competitor, Lyft, profit.  This is especially true when a Giglancer is using 
“expenses” like a car she already owned.  As such, for the payment of 
 
 77.  Elyce Kirchner & David Paredes, Exclusive Video: Lyft Driver Allegedly Attacks 
Pedestrian, NBC BAY AREA (Feb. 11, 2015, 3:40 PM), http://www.nbcbayarea.com/news/local/ 
Exclusive-Video-Lyft-Driver-Allegedly-Attacks-Pedestrian-240026921.html. 
 78.  Compare Legis. Counsel’s Digest, Ch. 389, Assemb. B. 2293 (Cal. 2014) (discussing 
Transportation Network Companies and insurance requirements), with Uber’s Insurance 
coverage, which falls slightly below this level at publication (see Nairi, Insurance for UberX With 
Ridesharing, UBER GLOBAL (Feb. 10, 2014), http://newsroom.uber.com/2014/02/insurance-for-
uberx-with-ridesharing). 
 79.  Prior to drafting this article, I conducted informal interviews with five Lyft drivers 
during rides.  Of these five, four worked for Uber as well sometimes, and these people switched 
platforms depending on the demand on that platform.  In addition, three of five reported that they 
had other jobs besides Giglancing.  One woman explained she was a certified family therapist 
with a master’s degree and an ongoing practice, but she drove Lyft on the weekends to have 
enough money to pay San Francisco rent. 
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business expenses, the proposed legislation would require the application 
of state law applicable to independent contractors unless a state specifically 
legislated to have a particular expense covered under particular 
circumstances.  Even without regulations requiring the payment of 
expenses, Gig Platforms may have market reasons to cover or share certain 
expenses.80 
E. Providing a “Startup” Grace Period 
Those who criticize any new regulation of Gig Platforms often 
bemoan what they consider an inevitable stifling of innovation through 
regulation: “If Uber and Lyft had to guarantee minimum wages, buy cars, 
and take on the liability for 25,000 cars in a city, they could not have 
existed in the first place!” 
Early-stage companies often have no choice but to ignore onerous 
laws or see their businesses fail.  Legal compliance can be expensive.  
Without opining as to whether this practice is correct, it’s certainly true that 
Uber and Lyft (and a number of other “on-demand” entities) are not in 
compliance with every city ordinance, livery fee, hotel tax, etc.  In other 
contexts — namely the ACA81 — expensive compliance requirements 
exempt smaller businesses; then, once a business grows large enough (for 
example, 100 employees) regulatory compliance becomes mandatory.  If 
stifling innovation is a concern, it can be assuaged by exempting Gig 
Platforms with less than n (i.e., 50) 1099-G forms filed in a given year from 
being treated as employers for vicarious liability or workers’ compensation 
purposes. 
VII. Conclusion 
For our laws to effectively evolve with our markets, a critical review 
of those markets is warranted.  In the case of the Gig Platform, as 
distinguished from a Marketplace where an independent contractor 
relationship fits traditional public policy justifications and a Service 
Platform where an employee relationship fits traditional public policy 
justifications, no old-world categories fit perfectly.  Rather than leaving 
Gig Platforms guessing — or spending to fight litigation rather than 
 
 80.   See, e.g., Josh Lowensohn, Lyft Goes After Uber’s Black Cars With New High-End 
Rides, THE VERGE, May 8, 2014, http://www.theverge.com/2014/5/8/5694720/lyft-goes-after-
ubers-black-cars-with-new-high-end-rides. 
 81.  The ACA and its implementing regulations create a filing requirement for businesses 
with 50-100 employees, but only require employers to provide “Minimum Essential Coverage” if 
they have 100 or more employees.  See Affordable Care Act Tax Provisions for Employers, IRS, 
http://www.irs.gov/Affordable-Care-Act/Employers. 
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comply with a reasoned framework — there is an opportunity to 
promulgate intelligent revisions to worker classification frameworks.  If 
promulgated from Congress in a way that clearly indicates to the 
marketplace where compliance is required, this is feasible.  Congress 
would need to (1) create a means to identify a Giglancer, such as a 
particular annual tax filing, (2) identify where Giglancers should be treated 
as employees, (3) identify where they should be treated as independent 
contractors, and (4) categorically limit the enforceability of online terms in 
wsays consistent with public policy. 
“Take it or leave it” terms have grown commonplace in e-commerce, 
but there are limits to where public policy permits them.  Courts and 
administrative agencies have begun, piecemeal, to attempt to define such 
limits, but the nature of the worker classification questions and the need for 
case-by-case analysis of the issue by a fact finder makes it incredibly 
difficult for market actors to implement compliance. 
It seems an appropriate time, therefore, for Congress to provide such 
guidance.  Fortunately, a simple comparison of On-Demand entities reveals 
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